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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused some international 
trade distortions, most of which were temporary.1 Thus, 
although the global closure of borders in the early months 
of the COVID-19 crisis prompted a severe decline in world 
trade, there was a turnaround towards end-2020. As a 
result, international trade flows had by then recovered 
their pre-pandemic levels (see Section 1.2 of Chapter 1 of 
this Report). 
An example of the temporary nature of some of the 
distortions arising as a consequence of the pandemic 
were the protectionist measures many countries 
temporarily adopted in respect of trade in medical 
products, in light of the supply problems that were 
particularly prominent in March and April last year2 (see 
Chart 1.1.). More recently, some restrictions have been 
placed on the distribution of vaccines against COVID-19. 
Although these will foreseeably be lifted once the 
pandemic is under control, their presence might hamper 
the effective distribution of vaccines globally. 
Notwithstanding, several geopolitically geared initiatives 
launched recently might indeed have a lasting effect on 
the relocation of activity and the reorganisation of global 
value chains (GVCs). For example, countries such as the 
United States, Japan and South Korea have announced 
incentives in recent months for the renationalisation of 
productive processes by means of subsidies and tax 
credits. Within the EU, some countries, such as France, 
have also approved budget funds to support the return of 
companies. The EU itself has undertaken several initiatives 
under the so-called “open strategic autonomy” strategy, 
which seeks to increase the robustness of European 
production chains and to lessen the dependence on third 
countries in some strategic areas.3
However, when assessing these developments, it is 
important to bear in mind that, in the current crisis, those 
firms whose production is more integrated into GVCs are 
precisely those that have performed better and which 
have experienced least disruption in their output. The 
evidence available, moreover, suggest that these 
companies have a greater capacity to recover following 
an adverse shock.4 Conversely, resorting to a higher 
amount of national inputs usually increases the volatility 
of GDP because it reduces the degree of risk 
diversification.5 Indeed, there has been proof6 in this crisis 
that, although those sectors of the EU countries, Japan 
and the United States most integrated into the GVCs bore 
the brunt of the initial external shock originating in China, 
when the pandemic also hit domestic markets, it was 
these firms that performed comparatively better (see 
Chart 2.1).
To interpret the recent measures, it should be borne in 
mind that these developments are part of a larger-scale 
pre-pandemic process that partly called into question the 
WTO rules-based multilateral framework. Notable 
milestones in this process have been the escalation of 
US-China trade rivalry in recent years (see Chart 1.2) and 
Brexit. While globally these episodes have not led to a 
generalised increase in tariff barriers, they have actually 
caused a notable rise in trade uncertainty,7 adversely 
affecting global trade, and they have prompted trade flow 
diversions. Specifically, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal 
from the EU will increase non-tariff barriers between the 
two areas and will necessitate numerous bilateral 
agreements between the United Kingdom and third 
countries8 (see Chart 1.4). In Spain’s case, it has also 
been apparent since the June 2016 Brexit referendum 
how Spanish firms (in particular those with greater trade 
exposure) have reduced their purchases from and sales to 
the United Kingdom and have increased trade with the 
EU. That has entailed a 14% decline in Spain-UK bilateral 
trade in goods in January 2021, compared with the same 
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month a year earlier.9 Apart from this case, in recent years 
the increase in non-tariff barriers10 has been global in 
scope (see Chart 1.3), largely reflecting the generalisation 
of higher environmental, social and labour market 
standards in respect of production processes for tradable 
goods and services.11
Box 2.2
GLOBAL TRADE FLOWS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE PANDEMIC (cont’d)
SOURCES: Global Trade Alert, OMC, Bown (2019), UNCTAD and own data.
a Number of measures per HS4 code, according to the WTO classification of medical products.
b Effective tariffs applied refers to the lower of preferential tariffs and Most Favoured Nation tariffs.
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Another process under way prior to the outbreak of the 
pandemic was the slowdown in international trade in 
goods. Various factors are estimated to have contributed 
here. In particular, the lower weight of international trade 
in goods as a percentage of global GDP in recent years 
(see Chart 2.2) would partly be the result of: the transition 
in China to a growth model based to a lesser extent on 
external trade;12 a tailing off of the dividends arising from 
the trade liberalisation measures adopted across the 
board in the decades prior to the financial crisis; and the 
slowdown in the scope for fragmentation of GVCs, which 
had already attained very high levels of complexity. Yet it 
should be mentioned that this slowdown in world trade in 
goods is proving compatible with an increase in regional 
Box 2.2
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SOURCES: World Bank, Comtrade, Eurostat, OECD, IMF, ASEANStatPortal and Espitia et al. (2021).
a The bars show the differential effect on bilateral exports of a share in global chains of a value of 1 percentage point higher, in the face of different 
shocks. The chart thus shows the results of the estimate of the effect on exports of a supply-side shock in the country of origin of the exports 
(left), a demand-side shock in the country of destination (centre) and a supply-side shock in the countries from which the inputs used come (right), 
at different times in the pandemic: February-April, when the input-supplying countries, such as China, were more affected; April-June, when the 
pandemic spread, and the aggregate. For more information see Espitia et al. (2021).
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trade, against a background in which trade ties among 
member countries of a single region have strengthened in 
many areas, in particular in North America and in the EU 
(see Chart 2.3).13
The counterpoint to the slowdown in trade in goods is a 
rising trend in global trade in services, which might be 
reinforced as a result of the pandemic. Indeed, services 
have become progressively more tradable in recent years 
– owing mainly to technological progress and digitalisation 
– and their weight in the productive processes for certain 
manufactures has increased.14 Recent experience might 
strengthen this rising trend, by highlighting how 
digitalisation can make certain services tradable when 
they were previously not deemed to be so. This is the 
case, for instance, of so-called “tele-migrants”15 who, 
through digital technologies, can live in one country and 
provide services in others. 
In conclusion, there is clear evidence that sustaining a 
global framework of shared multilateral rules contributes 
to increasing the robustness and resilience of national 
economies. In particular, diversification and trade 
integration have helped tackle the impact of the current 
crisis and they will be a fundamental factor in driving the 
recovery. The pandemic has not affected the main factors 
stemming from the benefits derived from international 
trade, such as labour specialisation and the organisation 
of production. These have allowed the income of the 
world population to expand in recent decades. Moreover, 
some of the new emerging challenges – such as combating 
climate change and how the major digital corporations 
operate – are on a global scale, and should be addressed 
from a multilateral perspective. 
However, recent experience might indeed strengthen 
certain previous trends, with a geopolitical backdrop, that 
may lead to a greater geographical fragmentation of the 
movement of goods, services, capital and people. On the 
one hand, growing geopolitical competition, which is 
particularly visible in the technological realm, might 
heighten insofar as the digitalisation of activity increases 
dependence on specific technologies provided by major 
global players based chiefly in the United States and in 
China. On the other, the advanced economies’ diminished 
relative economic weight and rising inequality in these 
countries, which might fuel political and social polarisation 
processes, could prompt  changes  in agents’ preferences 
with respect to globalisation.
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